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Fiscal Federalism in Chinese Taxation1
The recent policy literature on fiscal federalism in China has concentrated on the large 
“vertical fiscal gap” resulting in inadequate local provision of public goods and services. 
Thus there is an evident interest in giving local governments more taxing powers. 
After a brief historical survey, the article discusses a 1993 State Council directive that 
centralized taxing power. This has led local governments to make use of their control 
over tax administration to alter effective tax rates, and to the practice of “refund after 
collection”, whereby local governments disguise tax cuts as expenditures, following 
a logic opposite to tax expenditures. This study concludes, firstly, that the allocation 
of taxing power is still done outside the framework of the law, and secondly, that the 
government has not been able to settle on a stable allocation. Skirmishes over the control 
of local tax reductions and preferences remain a continuous affair.
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1.  Introduction 
Among public finance scholars, it is widely agreed that the idea of “fiscal federalism” – the 
allocation of taxing powers and expenditure responsibilities among different levels of gov-
ernment in a single polity – applies to states that are politically unitary just as it does to 
politically federalist states. This is because even in a unified state with hierarchical levels of 
government, the higher levels of government may devolve tax and/or spending decisions 
to lower ones. China, which is a unitary state,2 illustrates this point perfectly through the 
distribution of spending powers among its central (i.e. national) and sub-national levels of 
government. By what is considered the “most common measure of the extent to which a 
system is centralized [,] the centralization ratio, [i.e.] the proportion of total government 
* Associate Professor of Law at China University of Political Science and Law. The author can be con-
tacted at wei.cui@aya.yale.edu.
1. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Jie Cheng at Tsinghua University Law School for 
discussions of the Chinese Constitution and other aspects of the subject of this chapter.
2. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, as last amended in 2004 (the “Constitution”), art. 3.
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expenditures made by the central government”,3 China is more decentralized – and there-
fore, one might say, more “federalist”– than some federalist polities. In 2008, this ratio in 
China was a low 21.42%,4 compared to 43% in Canada (in 2002) and 51% in the United 
States (in 1999).5 Therefore, one should not be surprised to learn that fiscal federalism, in its 
substance, has been a perennial topic in discussions of the Chinese economy and Chinese 
politics both within China and abroad, even though such discussions are often conducted 
under the heading of “central-local fiscal relations,” while the term “fiscal federalism” is 
often eschewed for political reasons.6
Western theories of multi-governmental public finance reflecting the founding works of 
Tiebout, Oates, etc. have been gradually introduced to China, not the least because such 
theories underlie some of the policy analyses and recommendations sponsored by the 
World Bank and other international organization engaged in dialogue with the Chinese 
government. As some scholars have pointed out,7 many such theories adopt assumptions 
about the political systems (e.g. multi-level democracies with party competition) in which 
tax and expenditure assignments are made, that may not hold in non-Western, including 
Chinese, contexts. In what sometimes purports to be a “second-generation” theory of fiscal 
federalism, social scientists have directly based their theories and evidence on phenomena 
associated with transitional economies, claiming, for example, that decentralization, by cre-
ating intra-governmental competition, can promote economic growth.8 Both the conceptual 
underpinnings of such theories and the evidence adduced to support them have been subject 
to vigorous debates.9
The more recent policy literature on fiscal federalism in China has focused on the current 
large “vertical fiscal gap”, which refers to the phenomenon where the central government 
receives much more tax revenue than it directly spends, and where local governments’ shares 
of tax revenue fall short of their shares of expenditures. Because of this gap, local govern-
ments rely heavily on non-tax sources of local revenue and transfer payments from the cen-
3. Rosen, Public finance, p. 506.
4. Author’s computation is based on the Report of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) on the Implementation of 
the 2008 Central and Local Budgetary Plans (the “2008 Budget”, Mar. 5, 2009), available in Chinese at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-03/15/content_11014326.htm. 
5. Rosen, Public finance, supra note 1, pp 506-7. This ratio was 81% in France (a unitary state) in 2002. Id.
6. For anthologies of discussions in Chinese, see, e.g. Liu Kegu and Jia Kang, Thirty years of Chinese fiscal and 
tax reform: personal accounts and retrospections (Economic Science Press, 2009)( “Thirty years”), Chapter 2; 
Liu Jibin (ed.), Research on reform of the national public finance system (Democracy and Law Press, 2008). 
For anthologies in English, see, e.g. Lou Jiwei and Wang Shuilin, Public finance in China (World Bank 2008); 
Vivienne Shue and Christine Wong (eds), Paying for progress in China: public finance, human welfare and 
changing patterns of inequality (Routledge, 2007); The World Bank,Report: China: national development and 
subnational finance, a review of provincial expenditures (2002).
7. See, e.g. Roy W. Bahl, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Public Finance: What Is Next on the 
Reform Agenda?” in Joyce Yanyun Man and Yu-Hung Hong (eds.), China’s local public finance in transi-
tion (Lincoln Institute 2010); Richard Bird, “Taxation and Decentralization,” Economic Premise, No. 38, 
November 2010 (World Bank).
8. See, e.g. Wallace E. Oates, Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, International 
Tax and Public Finance, 12, 349-373, 2005; Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast, “Regional 
Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style,” Journal of Public Economics, September 
2005, 89(9-10), pp. 1719-1742.
9. See, e.g. See, e.g. Jonathan Rodden and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Does Federalism Preserve Markets?” 83 Va. 
L. Rev. 1521; Olivier Blanchard and Andrei Shleifer, “Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: 
China Versus Russia,” IMF Staff Papers, 48, Special Issue, pp. 171-9 (2001); Hongbin Cai and Daniel 
Treisman “State corroding federalism,” Journal of Public Economics, 88, pp. 819-843 (2004); Hongbin 
Cai and Daniel Treisman, “Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle,” World 
Politics, 58:505-535, 2006.
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ter for their operations.10 For example, in 2008, while the sub-national levels of government 
were responsible for 78.58% of total government expenditures, they were directly allocated 
only 42.89% of total tax revenue.11 This is perceived to be partly responsible for the under-
provision of public goods and services such as education, medical care, poverty assistance, 
etc. by local governments in much of the country. There is thus a persistent interest in the 
questions of whether, and how, taxing power may be decentralized to a greater extent than 
it is today. Moreover, the fairly quick pace of Chinese tax reform – including the upcoming 
integration of the VAT and the Business Tax, the possible introduction of a western-style 
property tax and miscellaneous environmental taxes – continues to raise the inevitable ques-
tion of how the distribution of taxing powers will be shifted when China’s tax structure is 
reconfigured. 
As this chapter will show, the legal debate about the decentralization of taxing power in 
China has mainly centered around a directive issued by the State Council (China’s cabinet) at 
the end of 1993, which, at the same time as launching the well-known and widely-discussed 
tax reform of 1994,12 announced that legislative power regarding taxation would be reserved 
exclusively for the central government (the “centralization doctrine”). This directive has no 
constitutional basis, and its subsequent statutory incarnations are all either incomplete or 
ambiguous. Moreover, in the adoption of tax regulations for many types of taxes, there have 
been numerous deviations from this principle of centralization, and the bearing of such 
deviations on the centralization doctrine is unclear. Just as importantly, the central govern-
ment has not been able to effectively enforce the centralization doctrine against local govern-
ments, especially in terms of curtailing local tax preferences. Throughout the 17 years since 
the adoption of the State Council centralization directive, local governments have found 
and continue to find ways to offer tax preferences unauthorized by the central government, 
through either manipulations of or simple disregard for written rules. Finally, the policy jus-
tifications for the centralization doctrine have not been sufficiently articulated. All these cast 
doubt on whether the centralization of tax legislative power is indeed a fundamental norma-
tive principle for Chinese law and policy, and whether it is not instead, as a more skeptical 
view would hold, a mere slogan wielded by the central government as a non-neutral party in 
political contests. This means that fiscal federalism in taxation in China is still very much in 
an unsettled state, and does not represent a coherent model. 
The report will be organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the structure of gov-
ernment in China and the history of the devolution and centralization of taxing power 
between 1949 (when the People’s Republic of China was founded) and 1994. Section 3 then 
lays out the current legal framework, erected by 1994, that purports to vest tax legislative 
power exclusively with the central government, and highlights the framework’s infirmi-
ties and ambiguities. Section 4 then sets out the evolution (since 1994) and the current 
state of the “tax sharing” scheme (fenshui zhi) and the associated bifurcated system of tax 
10. See, e.g. Athar Hussain and Nicholas Stern, “Public Finances, the Role of the State, and Economic 
Transformation, 1978-2020,” and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Baoyun Qiao, Shuilin Wang, and Heng-Fu Zou, 
“Expenditure Assignments in China: Challenges and Policy Options,” Chapters 2 and 5 in Lou and Wang, 
Public finance in China.
11. Sub-national governments received 75.99% of all non-tax revenue, 46.72% of total fiscal (tax and non-tax) 
revenue, and local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) accounted for 30.24% of total SOE profits. All computa-
tions are based on the 2008 Budget.
12. The State Council Directive, as well as several important ancillary documents discussed in 3. and 4. below, 
were all issued in 1993, but their prescriptions, particularly regarding the tax sharing system, took effect in 
1994. This chapter therefore follows a long-established convention and speaks of the “1994 tax reform”.
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administration. These systems, though not codified in forms that possess clear legal effect, 
fundamentally shape tax legislation. After having thus delineated the legal and institutional 
architecture of a purportedly centralized tax system, Section 5 then details how local gov-
ernments have pursued unauthorized tax policies, explicit or disguised. It seems that local 
governments are mostly driven to offer tax reductions through such means, either to com-
pete for businesses generally or to promote or help particular enterprises, although more 
recently some local governments have also lobbied for the right to devise tax increases. The 
central government has periodically responded to such local initiatives in a negative fashion, 
issuing prohibitions against local tax reduction, but arguably doing so ineffectively. Finally, 
the Conclusion stakes out the claim that while the centralization doctrine imperfectly char-
acterizes the current distribution of taxing power in China, a coherent vision for (limited) 
decentralization has yet to be developed.
2.  Structure of Government and Historical Background 
2.1.  Levels of government 
There are currently five levels of government in China:13 the national or central government, 
provincial-level jurisdictions (sheng),14 prefectures/municipalities (diqu/shi),15 counties 
(xian), and townships (xiang or zhen).16 In each of the sub-national jurisdictions – it is com-
mon in China to refer to all of them (even provincial-level ones) as “local”–there is a people’s 
congress and a people’s government.17 A local people’s congress, the members of which are 
supposedly elected, is the ultimate seat of state power in that local jurisdiction. It in turn 
elects the top officials in the local people’s government, exercises the appointment and 
removal of power over top local judicial and procuratorial officers, as well as elects delegates 
to the people’s congress at the next-higher level. It is also supposed to exercise other powers 
to ensure the implementation of higher law and national economic and other policy agendas, 
monitor the performance of the local people’s government, and generally advance various 
local social interests.18 Importantly, each local people’s congress – down to the over 40,000 
townships – may adopt budgets for their respective jurisdiction.19 The people’s governments, 
on the other hand, represent the executive branch. At the provincial level, for example, the 
13. This administrative division is reflected, for example, in the Budget Law (National People’s Congress 
(NPC), Mar. 22, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art 2, although the Constitution (art. 30) provides for only 
four levels of administration, which do not include prefectures. In recent years, there has been a drive to 
reduce the number of layers of governments. For public finance purposes, this typically involves (1) having 
the province and the county deal directly with each other in fiscal management, skipping the prefecture, 
and (2) reducing the expenditure responsibilities of townships. After such administrative simplification, the 
remaining three layers of government (center-province-county) would bear greater resemblance to admin-
istrative divisions in other countries.
14. Excluding Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, there are 31 such jurisdictions at present: 4 centrally admin-
istered cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), 22 provinces and 5 ethnic autonomous regions 
(Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia and Inner Mongolia).
15. The contemporary prefecture is a product of administrative reform in the 1980s. The growth of the Chinese 
economy has meant that even counties are becoming major economic and administrative units, and there-
fore it is expected that prefectures will be phased out.
16. As of 2004 (the last time for which a public survey is available), there were 333 prefectures. 2,862 counties 
and 41,636 townships in China.
17. See, generally, Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments (Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC), Jul. 4, 1979, amended for the 4th time Oct. 24, 
2007). (“Organic Law of Local Governments”).
18. Id. arts. 4, 8-10.
19. The Budget Law, art. 2. Provincial-level governments may waive the requirement of adopting budgets for 
township-level governments that are not prepared to do so. Id.
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people’s government is essentially the office of the provincial governor and vice-governors, 
which supervises various departments and bureaus. The same arrangement of a head execu-
tive office and specific government agencies (e.g. those in charge of finance and of taxation) 
is replicated in lower-level jurisdictions. 
While it is tempting to think of the pairing of local people’s congresses and people’s 
governments as reflecting the familiar distinction between the legislative and executive 
branches of government, most local people’s congresses do not possess legislative power. 
The Constitution only endows people’s congresses of provincial-level jurisdictions with the 
power to enact local statutes (difangxing fagui).20 The Organic Law of Local Governments 
more expansively provides that people’s congresses of provincial capitals and certain “rela-
tively large cities” determined by the State Council may also adopt local statutes, subject to 
the approval of such statutes by the legislature of the provincial-level jurisdiction in which 
they sit.21 The Law on Legislation further adds that cities in which special economic zones 
are located can also adopt local statutes, subject to approval at the provincial level.22 Still, this 
implies a mere 49 local congresses below the provincial level that can make local statutes,23 a 
far smaller number even than the number of prefectures, let alone counties and townships. 
Under the current Chinese legal system, codified most importantly in the Law on Legislation, 
only two forms of generally applicable rules adopted by government entities at sub-national 
levels have a formal, independent legal effect.24 These are local statutes and local govern-
ment regulations: the latter may only be adopted by people’s governments at those levels 
of jurisdictions where the corresponding people’s congresses have the power to adopt local 
statutes.25 This means that there are far fewer local law-making bodies than there are bud-
getary units, and most local congresses exercise their budgetary and other powers without 
the binding force of law. This has important implications for the tax dimension of fiscal 
federalism: if lawmaking power in general is decentralized only to this limited extent, the 
decentralization of tax lawmaking power must of necessity also be limited. 
20. The Constitution, art. 100.
21. Organic Law of Local Governments. Art 7. No local statutes may contravene the Constitution, national stat-
utes or State Council regulations, and they must be filed with the NPCSC and the State Council for record. 
Id.
22. Law on Legislation (NPC, Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul. 1, 2000), art. 68.
23. These are located in 27 provincial capitals, 4 cities that host special economic zones, and 18 “relatively large 
cities” specially designated by the State Council.
24. This is reflected in many statutes adopted after the Law on Legislation (2000) and is most importantly 
enforced through the Administrative Litigation Law (NPC, April 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), which, 
under the interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court, only accepts rules recognized as law by the Law 
on Legislation as independent sources of law when adjudicating disputes with government entities. See, 
generally, Wei Cui, “The Rule of Law in Chinese Tax Administration”, Judith Freedman, Chris Evans, Rick 
Krever (Eds.), The delicate balance: taxation, discretions and the rule of law (IBFD 2011), pp. 335-366.
25. Law on Legislation, art. 73. At the national level, sources of law include the Constitution, laws (falü) adopted 
by the NPC or NPCSC, “administrative regulations” (xingzheng fagui) issued by the State Council, and 
ministerial regulations (bumen guizhang) issued by the central ministries.
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2.2.  Brief pre-1994 history of devolution and recentralization 
Ever since the founding of the People’s Republic, the Chinese government has struggled 
with the question of how to allocate taxing power within a unitary state. Under the “Key 
Rules for Implementing National Taxation Policies”,26 an executive decree issued in 1950 
(before the nation’s first Constitution was adopted), the central government attempted to 
create national order in taxation by centralizing the power of making tax law, imposing or 
ceasing to impose any given tax, and adjusting the tax base and tax rates.27 Nonetheless, 
local, particularly provincial, governments were given some authority for legislating local 
taxes, subject to the approval of the central government.28 In 1958, on the eve of the Great 
Leap Forward – Mao Zedong’s attempt to accelerate economic modernization through 
mass mobilization – the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) 
approved the State Council’s “Provisions for Improving the Tax Administration System”,29 
which further decentralized tax  legislative powers. The “Provisions” laid out the following 
principles for “improving the system of national tax administration”30: “any tax that could be 
administered by [provincial-level jurisdictions] should be administrated by them; for those 
taxes that remain administered by the central government, [provincial-level] governments 
should be given some scope for flexible adjustments; and [such governments] should be 
allowed to make tax regulations and introduce local taxes.”31 Some attempts at recentraliza-
tion were made in the early 1960s, but the Cultural Revolution only deepened the extent of 
devolution.32
One year after the end of the Cultural Revolution had been declared, the State Council once 
again attempted to centralize the power to make tax law and policy. A set of rules drafted 
by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) provided that “any change of national tax policies, the 
promulgation and implementation of tax laws, the initiation or termination of the collection 
of any tax, and changes in taxable items and tax rates shall all be ruled uniformly by the State 
Council.”33 For the main part, provincial governments could only make specific measures 
for tax collection to implement the central unified tax laws, although they could still decide, 
with the approval of the MOF, to either begin or terminate the collection of a certain tax, and 
26. See, Liu Zuo, “The First Guiding Document in the History of Taxation of New China”, China Taxation 
News, Jan. 16, 2009, p. 4.
27. Fu Hongwei, “The Understanding and Evaluation of the Framework Rules for Tax Legislative Power,” 
Taxation Research 2004(12), pp. 33-5 (at p. 33).
28. See, Liu Zuo, “Local Taxes in the Early History of the Republic,” available in Chinese at http://www.dfczyj.
com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=455; Huo Jun, “Sixty Years of Evolution of the System of Tax 
Administration in New China,” Research on Contemporary Chinese History, 2010, No. 3, pp. 52-9.
29. Adopted by the 75th Plenary Meeting of the State Council on Apr. 11, 1958, approved by the 97th Meeting of 
the NPCSC on Jun. 5, 1958, and publicly released as a State Council Decree on Jun. 5, 1958.
30. “Under the historical conditions of that time, law was merely a tool of administration, and not a standard 
that limits government behavior, and so the institutional perspective of allocating and analyzing taxing 
power in terms of law did not exist. The ‘system of tax administration’ was a general term covering many 
specific systems such as tax legislation, enforcement and adjudication.” Fu Hongwei, “The Understanding 
and Evaluation of the Framework Rules for Tax Legislative Power, at p. 33.
31. Id. “In other words, the administrative power for taxes that have their revenue allocated to local govern-
ments was granted entirely to provincial-level governments; the latter were also given some power for 
adjustments, reductions and exemptions for centrally-administered taxes.”.
32. Huo Jun, “Sixty Years of Evolution of the System of Tax Administration in New China”.
33. Measures on the System of Tax Administration, approved and released by the State Council, Nov. 13, 1977, 
art. 1. This provision has been criticized for bypassing the NPC and thus as “representative of an age of ram-
pant nihilism about the rule of law”. Fu Hongwei, “The Understanding and Evaluation of the Framework 
Rules for Tax Legislative Power”.
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to implement tax exemptions and reductions.34 However, throughout the 1980s, the extent 
of decentralization in taxation became much greater than these provisions suggest. Because 
the central government itself did not organize tax collection (as it does today through the 
State Tax Bureau system),35 and instead relied on local governments to remit its share of tax 
revenue, tax agencies across the country soon became more like agents of their local govern-
ment bosses than implementers of national law. Actual tax policy became more varied across 
localities than it had ever been. Indeed, as long as provincial governments fulfilled their fis-
cal contracts with the center (which set targets for revenue remittance), the center exercised 
little additional control. Moreover, the very function of taxation was just gradually being 
revived as China was leaving socialist economic planning behind, and the new taxes devised 
by the central government were merely transient, experimental measures that often faltered. 
As a result, centralized tax legislative power meant very little. It was not until the 1994 tax 
reform that it was given real substance, and that the legal framework for fiscal federalism in 
taxation became worthy of serious examination.
3.  Framework Rules on Tax Lawmaking 
3.1.  The Constitution: minimal guidance 
The Chinese Constitution, throughout its successive amendments, has merely stated that 
Chinese citizens have the obligation to pay tax in accordance with law,36 and contains no 
other provision regarding taxation.37 It is difficult to construe the term “law” as used here 
to refer only to national statutory law, because many other appearances of the term “law” in 
the Constitution clearly express a wider conception of law.38 Although the doctrine of “tax 
legalism” (shuishou fading zhuyi) – the idea that rights and obligations with respect to taxes 
must be provided by law adopted by the legislative branch, as the basic elements of a tax – 
has numerous adherents among Chinese scholars,39 this doctrine is generally not regarded 
as enshrined in the Constitution.
The Constitution does embody a view of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) as the supreme sources of law,40 which applies to all legislative 
matters, including taxation. Despite this Constitutional framework, the NPC made sweep-
ing and vague delegations of authority to the executive branch and the judiciary either to 
interpret or to make law during the 1980s, when it was still not fully prepared to function.41 
34. Id. arts. 2 and 4.
35. Discussed 4.2 infra.
36. The Constitution, art. 56.
37. Art. 117 of the Constitution recognizes “the autonomous rights to manage local fiscal affairs” on the part 
of ethnic autonomous regions, and provides that fiscal revenue allocated under the national fiscal system 
to an ethnic autonomous region may be used by that region under its own discretion. This report omits 
the special tax policies adopted for ethnic autonomous regions, which, for both normal policy and special 
political reasons, receive large transfers from the central government.
38. See, e.g. art. 18 of the Constitution (foreign businesses operating in China must comply with Chinese law).
39. See, e.g. Zhang Shouwen, “On Tax Legalism”, Legal Research (faxue yanjiu) 1996(6), pp. 57-65; Liu Jianwen 
and Shen Liping, “Two Basic Problems in the Law on Legislation and Tax Law,” Taxation Research (shuiwu 
yanjiu) 2001(7), pp. 70-5, at 70. According to the understanding of Chinese scholars, “tax legalism” suppos-
edly originated in the western concept of “no taxation without representations”, and had legal precedent in 
the English Petition of Right in 1627 and the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. Id.
40. Arts. 57-8, 62, and 67 of the Constitution.
41. See, e.g., NPCSC, Resolution Regarding Strengthening the Interpretation of Law (Jun. 10, 1981); Decision of 
the NPCSC to Authorize the State Council to Reform the System of Industrial and Commercial Taxes and 
Issue Relevant Draft Tax Regulations for Trial Application (issued on Sep. 18, 1984 and repealed on Jun. 27, 
2009).
WORLD TAX JOURNAL OCTOBER 2011 | 462 
Wei Cui
Among these acts of delegation was one that occurred in 1985 and that is still believed to 
operate today, whereby the NPC gave blank permission to the State Council to make rules 
or regulations regarding all issues relating to “reform of the economic system and opening 
to foreign countries.”42 The mandate is understood to encompass all tax policymaking. The 
constitutionality of this delegation has been extensively discussed by scholars, but because 
the Chinese Constitution is not currently justiciable and constitutional review by the NPC 
almost unheard of,43 the issue remains somewhat theoretical. Indeed, some scholars have 
argued that the 1985 Delegation affirmed parliamentary supremacy, by making it clear that 
the State Council merely exercises delegated authority in its lawmaking activities in the eco-
nomic area, whereas beforehand, it was not clear that the decisions of the State Council were 
subject to any legal constraint.44
Finally, the following negative inference may be drawn from the Constitution. The 
Constitution recognizes the legislative power of both national and provincial-level 
legislatures,45 and contains no provision suggesting that tax legislative power is somehow 
different and reserved for the central government. In other words, the Constitution itself 
does not contemplate the centralization of taxing power.46 Given the supremacy of the 
national legislature, national statutes may still provide for such centralization, but as we will 
see in 3.3., existing statutory provisions on this matter are not entirely unequivocal.
3.2.  The 1993 State Council Directive 
In the tax area, the most important exercise of the 1985 Delegation by the State Council is 
arguably the latter’s orchestration of the 1994 tax reform, which founded the structure of 
Chinese taxation that still stands today and is sometimes claimed to be the most successful 
reform effort in the recent history of China’s economic transformation. At the center of that 
reform was a “decision”47 issued by the State Council at the end of 1993. This decision laid 
out the basic elements of a new system of fiscal management among the central and pro-
vincial governments, including, most importantly, a “tax sharing” system that governs how 
revenue for different taxes was to be collected and shared amongst central and provincial 
governments. Two policy objectives of the tax sharing system were clear: the central govern-
ment wanted to increase its share of total tax revenue in order to reverse a dangerous decline 
of such a share in prior years; it also wanted to take control of certain broad-based taxes 
(such as VAT and Enterprise Income Tax (EIT)) so as to use them as national economic 
policy tools. But arguably going beyond what was necessary to achieve these objectives, the 
1993 Decision also announced that the “legislative authority for central, shared, and local 
42. Decision of the NPC on Authorizing the State Council to Formulate Interim Provisions or Regulations 
Concerning Economic Structural Reform and Open Policy (Apr. 10, 1985) (hereinafter the 1985 Delegation).
43. No court may review the constitutionality of a law and such a review must be carried out by the NPC or 
NPCSC. Law on Legislation, arts. 88 and 90. As discussed in 3.3. below, the Law on Legislation attempts to 
impose certain constraints on delegations of legislative power regarding taxation to the executive branch.
44. Fu Hongwei, “A Discussion of the Necessity and Feasibility of Giving Tax Legislative Power to Local 
Governments,” Administrative Law Review (xingzheng faxue yanjiu) 2002(2), pp. 28-32.
45. The Constitution, arts. 58 and 100. The State Council and national ministries also possess law-making 
power, Id, arts. 89 and 90. As discussed in 2.1. above, under the Organic Law of Local Governments and 
the Law on Legislation, the power of local legislation has been extended to certain people’s congresses and 
people’s governments below the provincial level.
46. Fu Hongwei, “The Understanding and Evaluation of the Framework Rules for Tax Legislative Power,” 
Taxation Research 2004(12), pp. 33-5 (at p. 34).
47. Guofa [1993]85 (State Council, Dec. 15, 1993) [Decision Regarding the Implementation of the Tax Sharing 
System of Fiscal Management] (“1993 Decision”).
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taxes must all be vested in the Central Government, so as to ensure the uniform command 
of the Central Government, and to maintain a uniform national market and fair competition 
among enterprises.”48
It is of course unclear why any degree of decentralization of taxing power must necessarily 
obstruct inter-jurisdictional commerce or fair competition. As a matter of fact, the State 
Council left the decision whether or not to impose three minor taxes to provincial govern-
ments.49 In any case, the 1993 Decision advanced the most stringent statement of the central-
ization doctrine in taxation, compared to both what the central government had stated before 
1993 and what it has said since then. It also demonstrates how, within the Chinese context, 
delegation from the legislative to the executive branch can have important consequences 
for central-local fiscal relations. Through the 1993 Decision, the State Council took away 
not only tax legislative power from the executive branches of sub-national governments, 
concerning the policies of which it exercised control,50 but also deprived provincial people’s 
congresses of such power, even though it formally has no control over local legislatures. The 
fact that neither the NPC nor any local legislature challenged the legal process by which the 
1994 tax reform was accomplished reflects either these legislative bodies’ acquiescence, or 
their institutional weakness, or both.
Highlighting the point that the centralization of taxing power is by no means an inevitable 
or even natural consequence of the fact that China is a unitary state, the 1993 Decision 
leaves the systems of “fiscal management”– all affairs relating to revenue and expenditure 
assignments, as well as transfer payments – within provincial-level jurisdictions entirely to 
provincial governments to determine. The latter were only instructed to take the center-
provincial arrangement as a model.51 This act of devolution, again, occurred entirely within 
the executive branch, putting local legislatures out of play. The arrangement of having the 
executive branches of provincial governments determine intra-provincial fiscal affairs con-
tinues until today.52
3.3.  The current ambiguous legal framework 
A “decision” by the State Council has a questionable legal effect relative to national statutes 
and even formal regulations of the State Council.53 Chinese legal scholars have thus tended to 
cite several other pieces of statutory law when discussing the allocation of taxing power. The 
first of these is the Law on the Administration of Tax Collection (LATC),54 which was first 
enacted in 1992, before the 1994 tax reform. Article 3 of the LATC states that “the imposition 
48. Id. sec. 2(3).
49. These were the slaughter tax, the banquet tax and the livestock tax. For an explicit statement of this del-
egation, see, e.g. Guofa [1998] 4 (State Council, Mar. 12, 1998) [Notice Regarding Strengthening Taxation 
according to Law and Strictly Enforcing the Scope of Tax Administration].
50. The Constitution, art. 89(14).
51. The 1993 Decision, s 4(7); see also, Caidizi [1996] 24 (MOF, Mar. 26, 1996) [Notice Regarding the Opinion 
of the Ministry of Finance on Improving the Tax Sharing System of Fiscal Management within Provinces].
52. See, generally, Guofa [2002] 26 (State Council, Dec. 26, 2002) [Notice Forwarding the Opinion of the 
Ministry of Finance on Improving the Systems of Fiscal Management below the Provincial Level]. See also 
discussion in 4.3. below.
53. The 1993 Decision did not have the form of a State Council “administrative regulation”, and is strictly 
speaking an informal document. Therefore, its legal effect has long been questioned. See, e.g. Xu Shanda, 
The Chinese tax legal system (zhongguo shuishou fazhilun) (Taxation Press, 1997), p. 305 (cited in Liu 
Jianwen, “A Study of Issues in Chinese Tax Legislation,” available from www.chinalawinfo.com).
54. NPC, Sep. 4, 1992, effective as amended May 1, 2001.
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of a tax or the cessation thereof, the reduction, exemption, refund or additional payment of 
tax shall be implemented in accordance with statutes, or, if the State Council is authorized 
by statutes to formulate relevant provisions, in accordance with the relevant provisions 
prescribed in administrative regulations formulated by the State Council.”55 Very differ-
ent readings have been given to this provision. Some interpret it as reserving tax legislative 
power entirely to the NPC and State Council.56 Thus interpreted, the LATC would have to be 
viewed as setting forth a powerful doctrine of centralization even before the 1993 Decision 
of the State Council. However, the LATC provision was not invoked in any of the core docu-
ments of the 1994 tax reform, and part of that reform explicitly delegated the authority for 
the imposition or cessation of three minor taxes to provincial governments.57 An alternative 
interpretation is that as long as explicit procedures are followed, tax legislative power may 
be further delegated to other entities, including local governments. While more consistent 
with actual Chinese practice, this position seems inconsistent with legislative principles. Yet 
another interpretation lies between the first two and holds that while the legislative power 
for those components enumerated in the LATC provision is reserved for the NPC and State 
Council, the allocation of legislative power for other components of taxes is unrestricted by 
the LATC.58 It is probably fair to say that none of these conflicting interpretations prevails 
today. 
An important piece of legislation that accompanied the 1994 tax reform, the Budget Law, 
makes a feeble attempt to codify the 1994 tax sharing arrangement. It states that “the nation 
follows the central-local tax sharing system”,59 without defining such a system.60 All budget-
ary revenue (which includes tax revenue) is to be divided into three types: central, local and 
shared.61 The right to classify items of budgetary revenue as belonging to central or local 
budgets or shared among them is given to the State Council, whose decisions in this regard 
only have to be “filed” with the Standing Committee of the NPC, i.e. the latter entity has no 
power to approve or disapprove such classification.62 The Budget Law thus appears to have 
made a specific (at least compared to the blanket 1985 Delegation) statutory delegation of 
the decision on what taxes are central, local or shared taxes to the State Council. It makes 
no statement as to whether the power to impose or repeal taxes must be centralized. The 
Budget Law also prohibits agencies in charge of collecting budgetary revenue (including tax 
revenue) from using their discretion to reduce, exempt persons from, or delay the collection 
55. Id. art. 3. The provision goes on to say: “No governmental organs, entities or individuals may violate laws 
or administrative regulations or make decisions without authorization regarding the collection of tax or the 
cessation thereof, the reduction, exemption, refund and additional payments of tax.”
56. See Bu Yaowu, et al (Legal Affairs Commission of the NPCSC), “Annotations of the Law on the 
Administration of Tax Collection”, available online through www.chinalawinfo.com; Xu Shanda, The 
Chinese tax legal system (zhongguo shuishou fazhilun) (Taxation Press, 1997), p. 51 (cited in Fu Hongwei, “A 
Discussion of the Necessity and Feasibility of Giving Tax Legislative Power to Local Governments,” p. 30).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. The Budget Law, art. 8.
60. In the Implementation Regulations for the Budget Law (State Council Order No. 186, published and effec-
tive Nov. 22, 1995), art. 6, the tax sharing system was defined as “allocations of budgetary revenue according 
to tax types and based on the allocation of administrative and expenditure responsibilities among central 
and local governments” – a formulation copied from the 1993 Decision on Tax Sharing. The substance of 
such a system was to be determined by the State Council. Id. This could not be read as an enabling provision 
as the State Council would be delegating to itself.
61. Budget Law, art. 20.
62. Id. art. 21.
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of such revenue.63 However, this may be narrowly interpreted as imposing an obligation on 
tax collection agencies, and arguably does not bar local governments from returning their 
shares of collected tax revenue to taxpayers as budgetary expenditures. As we will see in 
Section 5 below, this latter practice was to become a popular method of local tax reductions.
The most frequently cited statutory authority for the centralization of tax legislative power 
is the Law on Legislation (“LL”) of 2000. Article 8 of the LL enumerates several categories of 
matters which must be governed by national statutes. Among them are “the basic economic 
system and basic systems of public finance, taxation, customs, finance and foreign trade.”64 
However, if national statutes have not been enacted on a matter reserved for national legis-
lation under Article 8, the NPC or its Standing Committee may authorize the State Council 
to adopt administrative regulations regarding the matter. The State Council may not then 
delegate the authorized power to any other entity.65 These provisions imply that only the 
NPC or the State Council can make tax law. However, as the 1992 LATC, an important 
ambiguity remains – what constitute “basic” systems of taxation? The State Council has 
offered the following interpretation: “The issuance of money, the setting of standard interest 
rates, the adjustment of exchange rates, and the adjustment of rates of the main taxes and 
other items subject to the Central Government’s macroeconomic adjustment … must all be 
governed by rules issued by the Central Government, and cannot be governed by local gov-
ernments” (emphasis added).66 There is an obvious element of equivocation here: perhaps it 
is only the “main taxes” that have to be centrally dictated, and even then, perhaps it is only 
the tax rates that have to be centrally dictated. In reality, the centralization of tax legislative 
power is far from absolute. The State Council has itself explicitly delegated many decisions 
on tax rates and tax base to provincial governments or even provincial tax agencies.67 A too-
comprehensive interpretation of what constitutes tax legislative power reserved exclusively 
to the central government would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the State Council has 
violated the prohibition against further delegation under Article 9 of the LL. 
Further complicating the issue is that the Law on Legislation to some extent questioned the 
continued validity of the 1985 Delegation. The LL requires the purpose and scope of any 
legislative delegation under Article 8 to be clearly defined.68 Further, it is expected that once 
the regulations issued under delegated authority have been tested in practice, the NPC or its 
Standing Committee would enact legislation in “a timely manner”, at which point the del-
egation on the matter would terminate.69 Both the unlimited scope and the indefinite nature 
of the 1985 Delegation are hard to square with these principles. 
63. Id. art. 45. See also, Implementation Regulations for the Budget Law, arts. 35 (tax reductions, exemptions 
and delayed collections can only be provided by national statutes, State Council regulations, and rules issued 
by the Ministry of Finance) and 51 (finance departments on different levels of government are to sanction 
any unauthorized acts of reducing, exempting, delaying the collection of, or returning taxes by tax collection 
agencies).
64. LL. art. 8(8).
65. Id. art. 10.
66. Guofa [2000]11 (State Council, Jun. 8, 2000) (Notice Regarding Implementation of the Law on Legislation), 
sec. 3.
67. Provincial tax agencies are either provincial State Tax Bureaus (STBs) or Local Tax Bureaus (LTBs). The 
distinction between the STB and LTB systems is discussed in 4.2 infra. “Provincial governments”, on the 
other hand, refer to the executive offices of the provincial governors, which have political control over local 
LTBs but not STBs.
68. The 1993 Decision, art. 10.
69. Id. art. 11.
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3.4.  Accepted forms of devolution of tax legislative powers 
Chart 1 below, shows a number of important taxes the revenue from which is either shared 
between the central and local governments or allocated entirely to the latter,70 and how vari-
ous elements of the tax base and tax rates are left to the discretion of provincial governments 
or tax agencies. What is delegated is, strictly speaking, legislative power: the power not just 
to interpret and implement rules but to make rules (within specific bounds). 
In view of this range of explicit, “legitimate” forms of delegation, the doctrine that tax 
legislative power must be centralized arguably has bite only with respect to the following 
issues: (1) whether local governments may impose new taxes for which there is no uniform 
national legislation; and (2) whether local governments have overstepped their delegated 
power in changing the tax base and tax rates in certain ways (including whether certain 
actions taken by local governments having the same effect as allowing tax reductions or 
exemptions should be treated as overstepping the scope of their taxing powers).71
Chart 1:  Explicit delegations to provincial governments or tax agencies to vary the base or rate of 
certain major taxes
Type of tax Items over which provincial governments or tax agencies possess 
discretion
VAT (shared) –  The VAT threshold (below which a business is exempted from VAT) within a 
prescribed range.
Individual Income Tax or 
IIT (shared)
–  The extent and duration of tax reductions for the disabled, the elderly 
without family, families of martyrs, those suffering heavy losses from serious 
natural calamities, or other IIT reductions permitted under IIT Law art. 5.
Enterprise Income Tax or 
EIT (shared)
–  The amounts of certain mandatory employment benefits which in turn 
would be used as limits within which the payment of such benefits would be 
deductible. 
Business Tax or BT (local) –  BT threshold within a certain prescribed range of monthly revenue; 
–  BT rate for entertainment services within a certain range (5%-20%); and
–  Profit percentage in applying cost-plus method for estimating revenue. 
Deed Tax (local) –  The tax rate, within the 3%-5% range; 
–  Whether it is the local finance bureaus or LTBs that will collect the deed tax, 
or whether some other agencies may be entrusted with collection; 
–  The precise scope of certain exempt types of property (for government, 
education, healthcare, scientific research, or military use); 
–  Whether the re-purchase of government-requisitioned property is taxable; 
and
–  Detailed implementation rules.
Urban Land Use Tax (local) –  The organization of measurement of taxable acreage; 
–  Tax rates within quite varied ranges, and different rates for different classes 
of land; 
–  Rate reductions or increases beyond the prescribed range, subject to MOF 
approval; 
–  Reductions for those unable to pay, conditional on approval of the SAT; 
–  Taxable period; and 
–  Detailed implementation rules.
70. For the revenue contribution of these taxes to overall tax revenue, see column 2 of Chart 2 in 3.1, infra. The 
tax sharing system is discussed in 4 below.
71. Contrast this summary with that provided in Ehtisham Ahmad, “Taxation Reforms and the Sequencing of 
Intergovernmental Reforms in China,” in Lou and Wang, Public Finance in China, pp. 112-3, which por-
trays a much smaller degree of local discretion over the bases and rates of various taxes.
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Type of tax items over which provincial governments or tax agencies possess 
discretion
Real Estate Tax (local) –  Extent (between 10% and 30%) to which taxable value may be reduced in 
computing tax liability; 
–  Tax reductions or exemptions for taxpayers “truly experiencing difficulties”; 
–  Taxable period within a year; and 
–  Detailed implementation rules.
Land Appreciation Tax or 
LAT (local)
–  Certain expenses are deductible in computing the taxable amount to the 
extent of a maximal percentage of other costs. The actual percentage within 
the maximum is determined by provincial governments;
–  The standard for “ordinary residence”–the selling of which is eligible for an 
exemption for an initial 20% of return on cost; and
–  Methods for prepaying LAT where property is transferred before construction 
is completed (in practice, supposed prepayments often ended up being final 
payments).
In summary, while the centralization doctrine regarding tax legislative power has some 
statutory basis, it is not free from ambiguities. More importantly, the doctrine must be seen 
against the background of weak constitutional guidance regarding taxation and fundamen-
tally problematic delegation to the executive branch. Moreover, the rationale for centraliza-
tion has not been sufficiently articulated. In Section 5, we will see that the central and local 
governments have continued to tussle over local tax policy initiatives. The outcomes of such 
tussles are not determined by courts, but like case law, they shed light on the likelihood of 
rules being followed. 
4.  The Tax Sharing Arrangement 
Even though the tax sharing system was established in 1993 by an executive fiat, and even 
though it is debatable whether the action was sufficiently authorized by the NPC, the system 
fundamentally shapes the dynamics of fiscal federalism in China. For one thing, any tax leg-
islation, especially one that has substantial impact on revenue, is likely to presuppose some 
political agreement (or expectation of such an agreement) about whether the revenue conse-
quences for local governments are tolerable within the then-applicable tax sharing system.72 
Moreover, whether a tax (or a component of a tax) is collected by tax agencies controlled by 
the central or local governments affects local governments’ ability to influence the impact 
of tax policy through administrative discretion. Furthermore, some local governments have 
taken the position that they are entitled to adopt what are effectively tax exemptions or 
reductions with respect to their shares of a particular type of tax revenue. Therefore, this 
section summarizes the tax sharing system. 
4.1.  The division of tax revenue 
The classification of taxes into central, shared and local taxes in 1993 were said to be based 
on the following considerations: central taxes were those “necessary for protecting national 
interest and implementing macroeconomic control;” shared taxes were “major taxes directly 
linked to economic development;” and local taxes were those “suitable for local adminis-
tration.” Moreover, it was expected that an ample variety of local taxes would be put into 
legislation in order to increase local revenue.73 Accordingly:
72. As we saw in the last section, the Budget Law and the Law on Legislation imply, whether or not intention-
ally, that the division of tax revenue is not a tax matter insofar as the Law on Legislation is concerned.
73. Id. sec. 3(2).
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–  Revenue from the following taxes were allocated entirely to the central government: 
tariff; VAT and excise tax74 collected at customs; excise tax; enterprise income tax (EIT) 
collected from centrally-owned SOEs and banks and other financial institutions; busi-
ness tax (BT) collected from the nationally-operated railroad system, and headquarters 
of banks and insurance companies. The center also took on full responsibility for export 
refunds (due to complete or partial zero rating under the VAT)
–  Revenue from the following taxes would be shared: VAT (75% to the center); stamp 
duty on securities transactions (50% to the center); resource tax (the offshore petroleum 
portion to the center, the rest to provinces).
–  Revenue from the following taxes would go to local governments: BT and EIT (except 
where reserved for the center, as described above); individual income tax (IIT); urban 
land use tax; urban maintenance and construction tax; real property tax; vehicle use tax; 
other stamp duty; tax on occupation of agricultural land; deed tax; land appreciation tax; 
and several taxes that were either subsequently repealed or never enacted.75
This division of revenue did not in fact determine the actual revenue distribution at the 
outset, thanks to what would become a standard technique adopted by Chinese politi-
cal leaders to achieve consensus on tax reforms: any new allocation of revenue would not 
reduce the previous amount of receipt by local jurisdictions; instead, the central government 
would return revenue to local governments to guarantee the latter at least as much revenue 
as was received before the new allocation took effect, and sometimes more.76 In 1994, for 
example, the amount of VAT and excise tax revenue that would be returned to provincial 
governments was determined by reference to revenue collected in 1993.77 And in subsequent 
years, revenue returned to any given province would increase at 30% of the rate at which 
combined VAT and excise tax revenue grew in that province.78 Because the central govern-
ment took the greater share of growth in these two taxes, over time its shares would approach 
the intended 75% and 100% ratio, and the importance of the revenue returned mechanism 
would diminish. Nonetheless, the mechanism partially undermined the redistributive func-
tion of centralization, by requiring the center to make transfer payments to the more pros-
perous provinces.79
The 1993 revenue allocation went through numerous subsequent adjustments, most of 
which were in favour of the center. Most importantly, the center came to share all EIT and 
PIT revenue with the provinces (50% in 2002 and 60% in 2003 and onwards), while keeping 
EIT revenue collected from the railroad and postal systems, the major national-level banks, 
74. The excise tax, imposed on select commodities (e.g. luxury goods, finished oil, automobiles, tobacco, etc) at 
different rates, is labeled “consumption tax” (xiaofei shui) in Chinese terminology.
75. Those repealed include certain agricultural taxes, the slaughter tax, the banquet tax, and a tax on fixed asset 
investment; the gift and estate tax was never enacted.
76. Such political agreements regarding revenue baselines were reached entirely outside the legislative branch, 
and through joint coordination by the executive branch and the Communist Party system. See Liu and Jia, 
Thirty years, chapter 8.
77. For the precise formula, see Li Ping and Xu Hongcai (eds), Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relations: illus-
trations and annotations (Public Finance and Economics Press, 2006), pp. 24-5.
78. Guofa [1994] 47 (State Council, Aug. 24, 1994) [Notice Regarding a Change to the Tax Sharing System of 
Fiscal Management by Linking Revenue Returned to Regional Growth of VAT and Excise Tax].
79. For discussions of these “tax rebates”, see Anwar Shah and Chunli Shen, “Fine-Tuning the Intergovernmental 
Transfer System to Create a Harmonious Society and a Level Playing Field for Regional Development,” 
in Lou and Wang, Public finance in China, pp. 131-135; Ehtisham Ahmad, “Taxation Reforms and the 
Sequencing of Intergovernmental Reforms in China,” id. pp. 107-110.
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and some of the largest oil and gas producers to itself. The resulting increase in revenue for 
the center was ear-marked for transfers to poor western provinces.80 Due to this reallocation, 
in 2005, the center claimed 7% of total income tax revenue as its own exclusive revenue, 
and 56% of the total income tax revenue as its portion of shared income taxes. However, 
because the increased allocation of income tax revenue to the center was also accomplished 
politically through a revenue-return arrangement, which protected the baseline income tax 
revenue received by the provinces in 2001, the provinces’ actual share of the total income 
tax revenue has been greater than what the nominal allocation would imply. For example, 
it was 66% in 2005.81
Other significant post-1994 adjustments include:82
– The center’s share of stamp duty on securities transactions increased to 88% in 1997 and 
further to 97% in 2000, at the expense of Shanghai and Shenzhen, the two cities where 
China’s major securities exchanges are located.
– The center’s share of VAT export refunds was reduced from 100% to 75% in 2004 for 
any incremental amount over a 2003 baseline. This percentage increased to 92.5% in 
2005.
– A new vehicle purchase tax was enacted in 2000 and made an exclusively central tax.83
– In 2009, six types of local transportation fees were abolished and replaced by an added 
category within the excise tax, the revenue of which is allocated to the center (although 
revenue is returned to the provinces by reference to a 2007 baseline).84
– The center’s share of BT revenue from financial and insurance institutions temporarily 
increased between 1997 and 2003.
These allocation changes may give a strong impression that the central government steadily 
encroached upon provincial governments’ revenue shares after 1994, and this perception is 
widely shared in China. Based on the government’s statistics, however, the center’s nominal 
share of fiscal revenue – before any revenue returned to provinces – reached an immediate 
high of 55.7% in 1994 and since then has fluctuated below that and 49%. In other words, 
there is no linear increase in the center’s percentage of total revenue as allocated. This is 
probably because the composition of tax revenue changed over time in favour of the local 
taxes, especially real estate related taxes. These local taxes grew faster than tax revenue in 
general and compensated for the diminishment of the provincial allocation percentage of 
shared taxes. On the other hand, the center’s share of total tax revenue increased almost lin-
early after taking revenue returned to the provinces into account: this share went from 21.2% 
in 1994 to 40.4% in 2005.85 This is likely explicable in terms of the rapid growth of overall 
80. Guofa [2001]37 (State Council, Dec. 31, 2001) [Plan for Reforming the Sharing of Income Tax Revenue].
81. Li and Xu, Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relations: illustrations and annotations, pp. 28-32.
82. See, id, pp. 27-35.
83. Provisional Regulations on the Vehicle Purchase Tax (State Council Order No. 294, Oct. 12, 2000, effective 
Jan. 1, 2001); Caiyu [2001]40 (MOF and SAT, Jan. 21, 2001) [Notice Regarding Budgetary Issues for the 
Vehicle Purchase Tax].
84. Guofa [2008]37 (State Council, Dec. 18, 2008) [Notice Regarding Implementing the Reform of Product Oil 
Prices and Certain Tax and Fees].
85. Li and Xu, Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relations: illustrations and annotations, pp. 36. In 2009, this 
percentage was 48.5% (author’s computation based on the Report of the MOF on the Implementation of the 
2009 Central and Local Budgetary Plans (Mar. 5, 2010, hereinafter the “2009 Budget”), available in Chinese 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/16/content_13181369.htm).
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tax revenue, relative to which the amount of tax revenue returned to provinces diminished 
substantially. In other words, the central government’s share of tax revenue has grown as the 
pre-1993 status quo (which favoured local governments) is left further behind, despite the 
increasing revenue importance of local taxes in recent years. 
Chart 2 below summarizes the result of the foregoing tax sharing arrangements for provin-
cial governments in 2009, given the composition of tax revenues. 
Chart 2: Tax Revenue Composition in 2009 and Resulting Revenue Share for Provincial Governmentsa
Type of Tax % of total tax revenue 
in 2009
Provincial % of tax
Domestic VAT (net of export refund) 20.15  25
Enterprise income tax 19.38  (<) 40
Business tax 15.15  (<) 100
VAT and excise on import 12.99   0
Domestic excise  8.00   0
Personal income tax  6.64  40
Deed tax  2.92  100
Tariff  2.49   0
Vehicle and vessel purchase tax  1.95   0
Urban land use tax  1.55  100
Real estate tax  1.35  100
Land appreciation tax  1.21  100
Tax on use of agricultural land  1.06  100
Stamp tax on securities transactions  0.86   3
Resource tax  0.57  (<) 100
Other  3.74  100
Provincial share of tax revenue not taking into account 
revenue return mechanisms
 (<) 43.02
a Author’s computation based on the 2009 Budget.
4.2.  The division of tax administration 
Just as important as the classification of central, shared and local taxes and the decision 
regarding the allocation percentages for the shared taxes is the division of tax administra-
tion. In connection with tax sharing, in 1993 the State Council established a bifurcated 
system of tax administration that comprised two subsystems: the state tax bureaus (STBs) 
and local tax bureaus (LTBs).86 The STB system is operated under the unified leadership of 
the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), and is divided into a hierarchy of four levels: 
the SAT, provincial STBs, prefecture/municipal-level STBs, and county-level STBs.87 Within 
the hierarchy, each of the lower three ranks reports to the next rank above. STBs at each 
rank determine the set-up of internal divisions, personnel, budgets and the appointment of 
bureau chiefs of STBs at the next lower rank within their geographic jurisdictions.88 LTBs at 
86. See Guobanfa [1993]87 (State Council General Office, Dec. 9, 1993) [Notice Regarding Distribution 
of the Practical Recommendations of the State Administration of Taxation for the Organization and 
Establishment of Directly Affiliated Tax Agencies in Local Jurisdictions and of Local Tax Bureaus] [“1993 
Tax Administration Circular”].
87. Id., sec. 2(2).
88. Id., sec. 2(3).
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provincial and lower levels, by contrast, operate in accordance with local government orga-
nization laws, and personnel, budget, and appointment matters are generally determined by 
local governments at the same level.89 Although the SAT is supposed to exercise some con-
trol over the provincial LTBs, its authority to do so is subordinate to that of the provincial 
governments.90 More specifically, the SAT is to provide tax policy and technical guidance, 
coordinate with LTBs to ensure the uniform implementation of the tax system and tax poli-
cies, and organize the exchange of information and experience; the heads of provincial LTBs 
can be appointed only after the approval of SAT is obtained; and the SAT is to be copied on 
tax plans and tax statistics submitted by LTBs to their respective local governments.91
In 1993, the State Council initially put the STB system in charge of the collection of not only 
the central taxes, but also all taxes due from all sellers in market fairs and sole proprietors, 
from foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and foreign enterprises, as well as IIT due from 
foreigners,which were all marked as local taxes.92 The resistance encountered by this admin-
istrative allocation powerfully illustrates the importance to local governments of controlling 
tax collection. Many local jurisdictions refused to allow this encroachment on their power to 
collect what were local taxes; instead, they divided the collection of taxes from FIEs, foreign 
enterprises and individuals, and small traders among STBs and LTBs in accordance with tax 
types. The State Council had to issue a special circular in 1994 urging local governments to 
“have faith” that taxes collected by STBs would be properly shared with local governments, in 
accordance with the tax sharing percentages determined in 1993.93 Nonetheless, ultimately it 
was the central government that backed down, and the right to collect local taxes from FIEs, 
foreign enterprises and individuals, and small traders was handed back to LTBs in 1996.94
Why did this fight occur? If local governments were guaranteed their proper shares in the 
revenue of a particular type of tax but did not have to bear the administrative cost of col-
lecting that tax, why would they object?95 It may be that local governments did not believe 
that the STBs had the competence to collect local taxes effectively. But an equally important 
possibility is that the control of tax administration implies the power to control effective tax 
rates, and local governments were (and still are) interested in such control.96 This latter pos-
sibility is supported by evidence from a later adjustment of administrative division of labour, 
which took place after the central-provincial income tax sharing percentage was changed in 
favour of the center in 2002. That reform triggered a re-allocation of EIT collection respon-
sibility among STBs and LTBs. Previously, STBs were responsible for EIT collection from 
89. Id. sec. 2(2).
90. Id. sec. 2(3).
91. Id. sec. 2(4).
92. Id. sec. 2(1).
93. Guobanfa [1994] 100 (State Council General Office, Nov. 9, 1994) [Notice Regarding Distribution of the 
Request of the State Administration of Taxation for Diligently Implementing the Division of Labour in Tax 
Administration among Central and Local Tax Agencies].
94. See Guobanfa [1996] 4 (State Council General Office, Jan. 24, 1996) [Notice Forwarding the Opinion of the 
State Administration of Taxation Regarding Adjusting the Respective Scope of Tax Administration of State 
and Local Tax Bureaus].
95. It was unclear whether, under the arrangement of Guobanfa [1994] 100, supra note 94, the additional cost 
of collection for the STB due to administering local taxes for select taxpayers was passed on to the local 
governments (by reducing the amount of revenue transferred to the latter). If this was the case, then local 
governments may object for the bureaucratic reason that they bore the (uncontrolled) cost of other agencies, 
especially the cost of personnel.
96. Control of administrative power may also bring about rent-seeking opportunities, but presumably the local 
governments themselves are less interested in this than staff members of LTBs.
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centrally-owned SOEs, FIEs, and certain special types of taxpayers (e.g. banks and financial 
institutions), whereas LTBs were responsible for EIT collection from others. Both systems, 
thus, had competence at EIT collection. The SAT announced in 2002 that while the division 
of labour among STBs and LTBs in terms of EIT collection with respect to taxpayers that 
existed as of the end of 2001 was to be kept unchanged, new businesses opening after 2001 
would be subject to the administration of STBs for EIT purposes.97 However, if businesses 
previously subject to the jurisdiction of LTBs were to reorganize and re-register, they would 
continue to be subject to LTB administration. The partial preservation of the jurisdiction of 
LTBs has been interpreted as a concession to local governments. Indeed, the central govern-
ment was explicitly concerned whether STBs and LTBs would be able to administer EIT law 
and policy in a consistent manner (even in a single jurisdiction). The SAT warned of how 
the lack of consistency could create unfairness and undermine the authority of tax agencies,98 
and specifically highlighted the possibility that tax collectors may use discretion in the prac-
tice of presumptive taxation and deliberately under-tax certain businesses.99
Although the SAT was not explicit about which type of agency, the STBs or LTBs, is more 
likely to adopt lenient tax policies, experience suggests that the LTBs have much greater 
incentive to do so. In short, whoever controls tax collection – a centrally- or locally-respon-
sible tax office – partially determines the extent to which local governments control the 
actual implementation of tax policy, and, therefore, the scope of tax competition, even in the 
absence of tax legislative power. 
Overall, however, there has been no trend in recent years towards centralizing tax admin-
istration in China. In 2008, collection jurisdiction for the EIT was re-allocated “in favour” 
of local governments: new enterprises formed in 2009 or after would not automatically fall 
under the jurisdiction of STBs for EIT purposes. Instead, STBs would administer EIT for 
those enterprises that pay VAT, and LTBs would administer EIT for businesses that pay BT 
(or neither VAT nor BT).100 This decision was probably based on efficiency considerations 
(e.g. facilitating cross-auditing of income and indirect taxes), although presumably a judg-
ment was also made that there was now sufficient consistency among STBs and LTBs in EIT 
enforcement. 
4.3.  Tax sharing below the provincial level 
According to the 1993 Decision of the State Council, the principles and aims of tax sharing 
are the following: the system would, “on the basis of the allocation of responsibilities among 
central and local governments, appropriately determine the scope of expenditures of differ-
ent levels of government; on the basis of matching expenditures and revenues, divide various 
taxes into central government taxes, local government taxes, and center-local shared taxes, 
97. Guoshuifa [2002]8 (SAT, Sep. 27, 2002) [Notice Regarding Issues in the Scope of Tax Administration after 
the Reform of the Tax Sharing System for the Income Taxes]. 
98. Guoshuifa [2002]120 (SAT, Sep. 12, 2002) [Notice Regarding Further Improving Tax Administration after 
the Reform of the Tax Sharing System for the Income Taxes], sec. 3.
99. Id. sec. 4. See, also, Guoshuifa [2003]76 (SAT, Jun. 25, 2003) [Supplemental Notice Regarding the Scope of 
Tax Administration after the Reform of the Tax Sharing System for the Income Taxes] (“STBs and LTBs …
should, within their respective scopes of administration, strengthen cooperation, and enhance communica-
tion, coordination and consultation regarding the implementation of various EIT policies and the use of 
presumptive taxation, and strictly enforce tax reduction or exemption policies under the EIT, in order to 
ensure the consistency and seriousness with which tax law is implemented.”)
100. Guoshuifa [2008]120 (SAT, Dec. 16, 2008) [Notice Regarding Issues in Adjusting the Scope of Income Tax 
Administration for New Enterprises].
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and create central and local tax administrations to administer the central and local systems 
of taxes separately; scientifically determine the amount of local revenue and expenditure, 
and gradually implement a relatively standardized system of revenue return and transfer 
payments from the center to local governments; and establish and improve government 
budgeting at different levels, and strengthen budgetary constraints.”101 Local governments 
were to follow these principles to implement similar tax-sharing systems among the different 
levels of government within their own jurisdictions.
In practice, provinces have adopted fairly diverse approaches for tax sharing within their 
jurisdictions.102 Most provinces share the revenue from the larger taxes (the local share 
of VAT, IIT and EIT, and BT) with prefectures/municipalities, or directly with counties. 
Fifteen provinces adopt a proportional scheme for such sharing, where the provincial 
jurisdiction takes the smaller percentage (from 30% to 50%), perhaps in recognition of the 
heavier expenditure responsibilities of lower-level governments. Four provinces practice 
such sharing by allocating business taxpayers between provincial and lower governments, 
while the other provinces adopt a mixture of proportional sharing and sharing by alloca-
tion of taxpayers. Some smaller taxes (e.g. resource tax, urban construction tax, stamp duty, 
etc.) are exclusively allocated to the prefecture or county levels. In some jurisdictions, the 
provincial government claims the (non-central-portion of) revenue from all or some taxes 
paid by certain industries. For example, 20 provinces claim the entire BT revenue collected 
from financial institutions for the provincial budget. The aggregate result of this is that in 
2005, provincial governments receive 24.6% of the total local revenue (compared to 17.1% 
in 1994), whereas county and township governments receive 38.6% (compared to 41.8% in 
1994); the remainder is revenue received by prefectures (36.7% in 2005 and 41.0% in 1994).103
A recent report highlighted inter-provincial diversity. In 2009, the provincial government’s 
share in the total budgetary revenue for Guangdong Province was only 19.9%, “lower than 
the national average of 23.5% and the 23.8% average for the eastern China region, [as well as 
the provincial share in Guangdong] before the 2001 income tax sharing reform, which had 
been 26.7”.104 Starting in 2011, Guangdong raised the provincial percentage for province-
county tax sharing from 40% to 50%, so as to allow the provincial government to make 
more equalization transfers to poorer regions in the province. The shared taxes included 
the local portions of the EIT and IIT, the BT paid by non-financial institutions, and the 
land appreciation tax. By contrast, in 2009, Hunan Province allocated the previously shared 
Land Appreciation Tax and Urban Land Use Tax entirely to prefecture/county levels, and 
increased the latter’s shares of VAT, BT and the resource tax to 75%. Starting in 2011, Hubei 
Province also allocated many shared taxes to lower levels of government.105
5.  Forms of Decentralization in a Centralized System 
Especially because of the strong incentives local politicians face for promoting economic 
growth, local governments in China, like local governments elsewhere, often try to offer tax 
101. 1993 Decision on Tax Sharing, sec. 1.
102. Li and Xu, Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relations: illustrations and annotations, p. 134.
103. Id. p. 148.
104. “Guangdong reforms province-county tax sharing, provincial share raised to 50%,” 21st Century Economic 
News, Jan. 12, 2011. The 2001 income tax sharing reform is one of the national/provincial centralization 
measures discussed in the text accompanying notes 80-81 supra.
105. Id.
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incentives to attract investment and nurture home-grown business. This would of course 
be impossible within a rigidly centralized tax system. Just how rigid the current system is 
in controlling local tax preferences is a topic that requires careful study. For the last two 
decades, hardly a year has gone by without some State Council, MOF or SAT announce-
ment chastising local non-compliance with the centrally-dictated tax order.106 The periodic 
campaigns and crackdowns evidence more a state of disequilibrium.
5.1.  Periodic crackdowns on local tax preferences and continuous negotiations 
Even before the State Council formally centralized tax legislative power in 1993-4, there had 
already been a long history of the central government trying to curtail local tax preferences. 
These local preferences may not only have created harmful competition, and may have been 
enacted in combination with local protectionist measures, but given that, before 1994, the 
central government’s fiscal capacity largely depended on local governments’ remittance of 
revenue (as opposed to collection by the centrally-controlled STB system), they directly 
threatened the revenue intake of the central government itself. In July 1993, on the eve of 
tax reform, the State Council ordered a national review of unauthorized preferential policies, 
and a year later the MOF and SAT reported 5,096 such policy items, resulting in a revenue 
loss of 5.35 billion yuan in 1993, over 1% of the total tax revenue collected during that year.107
Numerous central government decrees followed the 1993 Decision on Tax Sharing and 
targeted local tax preferences, claiming that they represented an unlawful encroachment on 
the central government’s rights.108 In March 1998, the State Council launched a nationwide 
campaign to identify systematically explicit and disguised unauthorized tax preferences. 
The notice announcing the campaign (the “1998 State Council Notice”)109 identified a range 
of problematic local practices, including, besides unauthorized grants of exemptions and 
reductions, grants of delayed payment or collection, tax amnesties, agreements for fixed pay-
ments (as a concessionary measure), accelerated collection, and deliberately mislabeling cen-
tral tax revenue as local tax revenue. The notice claimed that one of the major achievements 
of the 1994 tax reform was to cut back on local tax preferences, and re-emphasized that local 
governments did not have the right to make or interpret tax law without authorization. Local 
governments may make recommendations for changes in tax policy, but could not, before 
the State Council made a decision, implement such changes.110
106. For examples of these in recent years, Guoshuifa [2008]73 (SAT, Jul. 17, 2008) [Notice on Adhering to 
Administering Tax by Law and Strictly Administering Tax Reductions and Exemptions]; Guoshuihan 
[2008]1049 (SAT, Dec. 23, 2008) [Urgent Notice on the Strict Prohibition of Pre-collection of 2009 Taxes]; 
Caishui [2009]1(MOF and SAT, Jan. 19, 2009) [Notice on Resolutely Curbing Unauthorized Tax Reductions 
and Exemptions and Strengthening the Tax Administration according to Law] (claiming that some local 
governments have used the “international financial crisis” as an excuse for unauthorized tax reductions).
107. Caishuizi [1994]45 (MOF and SAT, Jul. 1, 1994)[Notice Regarding Opinions on the Clean-up of 
Unauthorized Tax Reductions and Exemptions]. The total national tax revenue during 1993 was 425.5 bil-
lion yuan, and it was regarded as unusually high because of local governments’ anticipation of the major 
reform in 1994.
108. See, e.g. Guofa [1994]24 (State Council, Apr. 19, 1994) [Notice on the Issue of Strictly Controlling the 
Reduction and Exemption of Import Taxes]; Guobanfa [1994]81 (General Office of the State Council, Jun. 
24, 1994) [Notice on Forwarding the Opinions of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of 
Taxation on Strengthening the Collection of Individual Income Tax].
109. Guofa [1998]4 (State Council, Mar. 12, 1998) [Notice on Strengthening Tax Administration according to 
Law and Strictly Delineating Tax Administration Powers].
110. The offer to consider the opinions of local governments seems to be a mere invitation for the latter to vol-
untarily propose good national tax policy.
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By the late 1990s, the central government had come to view even those local tax preferences 
that do not (directly) affect the central government, and only reduce local tax revenue, as 
unacceptable.111 In 2000, it launched another campaign to crack down on “refund after col-
lection” (xianzheng houfan, or RAC) and other disguised local tax reductions. RAC was a 
widely deployed mechanism where the government returns tax revenue collected from a 
particular taxpayer to that taxpayer, where the tax collected is recorded as a revenue item 
and the refund as an expenditure. RAC could serve as a means of local tax reduction when 
a local government first collects taxes in accordance with centrally-dictated laws and regula-
tions, and then returns all or part of the local share of the revenue to the taxpayer, claiming 
this as an expenditure item. Between 2000 and 2002, the State Council launched a very public 
campaign against local RAC policies. The campaign began with a stern notice from the State 
Council in January 2000 (the “2000 State Council Notice”),112 which claimed that local RAC 
practices “caused disorders in taxation, violated the principles of consistency in tax policy 
and centralization of taxing power, went against the needs of public finance, weakened the 
impact of fiscal policy, and created potential fiscal risks.” The notice ordered all local govern-
ments to end such policies from the beginning of 2000, and stated that if a local jurisdiction 
failed to end such practice, the central government would reduce transfer payments and 
other targeted subsidies for that jurisdiction as well as “hold relevant persons accountable.” 
After two years of investigations and negotiations, the State Council delivered a remarkable 
document in January 2002, publicly reprimanding eight of the nine provincial jurisdictions 
that had been investigated for either failing to comply fully with the 2000 State Council 
Notice or failing to stop subordinate jurisdictions from non-compliance.113 The harshly-
worded document claimed that such instances of non-compliance “severely disturbed the 
fiscal order, and harmed the unification of national tax policy.” Seven provinces and their 
subordinate jurisdictions were reported to have failed to halt a total of 30 items of RAC 
policies dating from before 2000, with the result that 2149 enterprises received a total of 
1.193 billion yuan worth of tax reductions, exemptions and rebates in 2000.114 In addition, 
seven provinces or their subdivisions initiated a total of 29 new preferential (including RAC) 
policies after the 2000, resulting in 5.46 million yuan improperly returned to taxpayers. 
The relatively small amount of these latter violations makes the decision to publicly repri-
mand even more notable.115 The State Council claimed that the offending jurisdictions were 
penalized in accordance with the 2000 State Council Notice– amounts were deducted from 
transfer payments and subsidies, and the SAT reprimanded individuals within its own scope 
of authority. 
Such public gestures, however, were to have no lasting effect. Although the national cam-
paign to end unauthorized preferences lasted well into the middle of the decade, even a very 
111. Guoshuifa [2002]120 (SAT, Sep. 12, 2002) [Notice Regarding Further Improving Tax Administration after 
the Reform of the Tax Sharing System for the Income Taxes].
112. Guofa [2000]2 (State Council, Jan. 11, 2000) [Notice Regarding Correcting the Unauthorized Adoption of 
Refund after Collection Policies]. 
113. Guobanfa [2002]5 (General Office of the State Council, Jan. 16, 2002) [Notification Concerning the Illegal 
Adoption of “Refund after Collection” and Other Policies of Tax Deduction and Exemption in Some 
Jurisdictions].
114. Specific examples named included Jilin Province’s agreement to a fixed tax payment by a provincial SOE, 
Dalian City’s (in Liaoning province) offering of tax preferences that had been allowed FIEs to domestically-
owned enterprises, Shanghai’s grant of tax exemptions to four “high technology” enterprises, and similar 
preferences offered by Fujian province to certain high-technology enterprises.
115. Total tax revenue in China in 2000 was 1.266 trillion yuan.
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casual survey of local practices adopted since 2005 and directed at just one sector, namely 
financial service and investment firms, points to the central government’s tenuous policy 
hold:
– In 2005, the City of Beijing adopted, as part of a larger package to encourage the devel-
opment of the financial service industry in the city and among other tax-related mea-
sures, a rule according to which any senior manager employed in a financial firm for 
over two years may receive a “bonus” from the government equal to 80% of the local 
share of the previous year’s IIT payments.116
– In 2007, the City of Tianjin offered a 3-year tax rebate of 50% of the local portion of EIT 
collected from newly-established venture capital companies that invest in logistics or 
high technology firms; certain other entities providing training or information in finan-
cial services were granted similar benefits, as well as 3 years of rebate of 50% of Business 
Tax paid.117
– In 2009, the Shanghai City Government offered a 50% deed tax rebate to certain finan-
cial service firms, and provided that individuals deemed to possess financial talents 
would also receive certain “bonuses”.118 These bonuses were widely reported to be 
refunds of tax payments, but in fear more of social controversies over giving money 
to the already rich than of revealing legal improprieties, the documents specifying the 
nature and amount of such bonuses were kept secret.119
– During the same year, the Pudong District (a special development zone) in Shanghai 
announced that 40% of all “fiscal capacity” generated by the salary income of high-level 
executives of private equity firms would be given back to such executives as “subsidies”; 
the percentage is lowered to 20% for “core investment personnel”. Moreover, 50% of 
all local fiscal revenue generated from the investment returns made by PE firms from 
certain investment targets in Pudong would be rebated to the PE firms as “awards”.120
– Also in 2008, Beijing announced that for certain asset management companies that are 
subject to the EIT, the portion of their EIT revenue that is claimed by county-level gov-
ernments would be rebated 100% for two years as an “award”, and rebated at a 50% rate 
for three subsequent years.121
– Shenzhen announced in 2010 that if a private equity fund invests in a Shenzhen entity 
or project, then it may be entitled to a one-time bonus equal to 30% of the “local fiscal 
116. Jingfagai [2005]2736 (Beijing Development and Reform Commission, 2005) [Detailed Rules Implementing 
the “Opinion Regarding the Promotion of the Financial Industry in the Capital].
117. Jinzhengfa [2007]93 (Tianjin Municipal Government, Dec. 14, 2007) [Notice Forwarding the Recom-
mendations of the Municipal Financial Services Office Regarding the Promotion of the Private Economy].
118. Hufufa [2009]40) (Shanghai City People’s Government, Aug. 4, 2009) [Certain Regulations regarding 
Concentrating Financial Resources, Enhancing Financial Services, and Promoting the Development of the 
Financial Industry].
119. See e.g. http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/sh.xinhuanet.com/2009-12/04/content_18408022.htm and 
http://www.cywh.gov.cn/news/cyfx/2009/12/09127839207792.html for examples of such reports in Chinese.
120. Pudong New District, Implementation Measures for Promoting the Development of Equity Investment 
Companies and Equity Investment Management Companies (Mar. 30, 2009). The measures are effective 
until the end of 2010.
121. Jingjinrongban [2009]5 (Office of the Beijing City Financial Services Affairs Leading Group and 4 other 
agencies, Apr. , 2009) [Opinions Regarding Promoting the Development of Equity Investment Funds].
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capacity” created upon “exit” from the investment, subject to a 3 million yuan cap per 
investment.122
The policies of the Chongqing City government in the real estate sector offer another dra-
matic example. In May 2008, Chongqing announced a set of measures to promote the hous-
ing market that included: a 50% immediate refund of Business Tax paid on real estate sales 
pursuant to certain promotional events; a 50% reduction in deed tax on such sales, which 
took the effective rate below the lower end of the 1-3% range allowed under State Council 
regulations; and a broad expansion of preferential EIT rates beyond the sectors contem-
plated under State Council regulations.123 In December 2008, Chongqing further announced 
that, for certain approved business reorganizations, the local portion of all taxes collectible 
on reorganization transactions would be refunded. Moreover, principal and interest pay-
ments on mortgages made by individuals who purchase residential housing for the first 
time may be credited against the local portion of IIT liabilities of such individuals.124 This 
last policy received national press attention, and was compared to similar policies adopted 
by Shanghai during the period from 1998 to 2002.125 In January 2009, just before the MOF/
SAT announced their next crackdown on local preferential policies, Chongqing introduced 
a further slew of BT and deed tax reductions, which went well beyond what central govern-
ment tax regulations permitted. The City further specified the first-time housing purchase 
IIT rebate policy, which was to last from December 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012.126
It appears that Chongqing was able to pursue this policy with impunity. One newspaper 
at the time reported that the MOF was ready to stop Chongqing, but later issued a public 
apology explaining that the MOF had merely “made a telephone inquiry” to Chongqing.127 
Whatever the content of that inquiry, in 2010, Chongqing re-announced the IIT RAC policy 
first published in 2008.128 This suggests that quite a number of local jurisdictions believe 
today that RAC and even other explicit, unauthorized reductions and exemptions are fair 
game, notwithstanding the mantra of centralization from the MOF, SAT, or even the State 
Council. 
5.2.  Local initiatives other than tax reductions 
It would be inaccurate to depict local governments in China as interested only in tax reduc-
tions where local tax policy initiatives are concerned. Such governments must raise revenue 
to fund their own operations, provide public services, and match central government grants. 
The imposition of miscellaneous, often extra-budgetary fees to supplement tax revenue has 
long been practiced. Also, through the exercise of administrative discretion in collection (e.g. 
by accelerating collection and delaying or denying proper refunds), tax agencies can increase 
122. Shenfu [2010]103 (Shenzheng Municipal Government, Jul. 9, 2010) [Certain Rules Regarding the Promotion 
of the Development of the Private Equity Fund Industry].
123. Yufufa [2008]61 (Chongqing Municipal Government, May 31, 2008) [Notice Regarding Adopting Adaptive 
Policy Measures to Promote Steady and Relatively Fast Economic Development].
124. Yufufa [2008]132 (Chongqing Municipal Government, Dec. 18, 2008) [Opinion Regarding Further Adopt-
ing Adaptive Policy Measures to Promote Steady and Relatively Fast Economic Development].
125. See, e.g. “Chongqing Lays Out Tax Refund Policy for Apartment Purchases to Stimulate the Housing 
Market”, Caijing, Jan. 21, 2009 (available at http://www.caijing.com.cn/2009-01-21/110050447.html).
126. Yufufa [2009]9 (Chongqing Municipal Government, Dec. 18, 2008) [Implementation Opinions Regarding 
Expanding Domestic Demand and Promoting the Healthy Development of the Real Estate Sector].
127. Editor’s Explanation, China Business News, Feb. 4, 2009, p. A2.
128. See report reproduced at the Chongqing Municipal Government website, “Purchasers of Housing in the 
City Center with Mortgages Will Receive Subsidies” (http://www.cq.gov.cn/today/news/248001.htm).
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actual tax burden to a certain extent. Interestingly, however, Chinese local governments 
for the most part seem not to have pursued tax policies per se that are aimed at increasing 
revenue beyond what central tax laws and regulations would permit to be collected. In other 
words, there is no analogue, in their efforts to raise revenue, to the rampant use of tax pref-
erences described in the last two subsections. Instead, where local governments do express 
a willingness to pursue higher or new taxes, they seem motivated by non-revenue purposes. 
In 2010, for example, four provinces were reported to have made offers to the central govern-
ment to pursue trial implementation of environmental tax measures, which could involve 
the imposition of new taxes.129 Their incentives for doing so are interesting. For example, 
Jiangxi had proposed and received approval for an ecological development zone for the 
Fanyang Lake area in its jurisdiction in 2009, in order to get a large “national strategy” grant 
from the State Council.130 And the idea of adopting environmental taxes was part of the pro-
posal. Hubei and Hunan are also engaged in building large economic development zones for 
which national grants or administrative preferences may be sought. However, because the 
offer of the provinces was for the central government to design environmental tax measures 
and simply for them to make trial implementations, the initiative is reported to have been 
bogged down because of an inter-agency turf fight (between the environmental ministry, the 
MOF and the SAT) at the central government level.
Reports in 2010 of certain cities proposing to impose new property taxes offer another set of 
examples. These proposals came in two varieties. On the one hand, some jurisdictions may 
have advanced their own designs. Chongqing was reported to have submitted a proposal to 
the State Council for imposing a special consumption tax on purchases of high-end hous-
ing in Chongqing,131 while Shanghai suggested a property tax for itself instead.132 In both 
cases, the aim was not to raise revenue but to create specific incentives or disincentives for 
market behaviour. On the other hand, other cities including Hangzhou and Shenzhen (both 
of which have long been centers of the real estate boom) actively pursued mandates from 
the MOF and SAT to develop assessment systems to be used in the future implementation 
of a property tax. Not only did they succeed in building such systems, they also used them 
to improve the administration of existing real estaterelated taxes. Not surprisingly, these 
cities have also become advocates of the introduction of the property tax, either locally or 
nationally. 
6.  Conclusion 
The depiction this report has given of the current state of fiscal federalism in Chinese taxa-
tion may perhaps be distilled into the following three themes. 
First, the decision-making process about how taxing power is allocated among the central 
and sub-national governments still lies almost entirely outside the framework of law. This 
129. See Reuters, “China may launch environmental tax trial,” Aug. 5, 2010; “Four Provinces Hope to Become 
First Environmental Pilots; Revenue May be Split between Center and Localities,” 21st Century Economic 
Report, Aug. 10, 2010. One of the provinces (Hubei) had already experimented with the collection of exist-
ing pollution charges by tax authorities. Id.
130. See “Environmental Tax Pilot Projects Not Expected to Launch with 2010,” Economic Observer News, Aug. 
6, 2010.
131. “Real Estate Speculation May be Subject to High Tax, Property Tax Brewing,” China Securities News, Apr. 
23, 2010.
132. See “Shanghai, Chongqing Experimental Plan for Property Tax Not Yet Approved,” Caixin, Jul. 8, 2010 
(http://economy.caing.com/2010-07-08/100159271.html).
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means that the most fundamental structural components of the Chinese tax system are not 
regulated by statutes or even formal regulations. The “tax sharing” arrangement–both in its 
revenue allocation aspect and its division of labour between the LTB and STB systems–is a 
salient case in point. For all shared taxes and local taxes (i.e. all taxes where the central gov-
ernment is not the exclusive claimant to revenue), design features such as the tax base, tax 
rates, the method of administration and the extent of tax preferences may have substantial 
impacts on the budgets of sub-national governments, and yet while these design features 
may be modified within the framework of law, the modification of the revenue allocation 
and administrative arrangements, under the current system, cannot. Thus the possibility 
for any reform of the tax law is contingent on either the achievement of consensus through 
legally unstructured political processes internal to the executive branch (and the Communist 
Party), or simply the ability of the central government to dominate those processes at a 
particular point in time. The legislative branch of government, both at the national and sub-
national levels, is still weak. The NPC, in particular, continues to acquiesce in the blanket 
delegation of tax legislative power to the executive branch made a quarter of a century ago. 
These political configurations explain much of the ambiguities and gaps in the fiscal legal 
framework described in Section 3.
Secondly, even after having dispensed with representative democracy and legislative delib-
eration, the government has not been able to settle on a stable allocation of taxing powers, 
let alone one that comports with theoretical recommendations. As discussed in 4.3., below 
the provincial level a very diverse range of fiscal arrangements have been made, sometimes 
in disregard of the central government’s recommendation to copy the central-provincial tax 
sharing system. And as discussed in 5., between the center and the provinces, prominent 
skirmishes over the control of local tax reductions and preferences are a continuous affair. 
The central government has adopted a problematic approach for approving variations in 
local tax policies: such variations must (i) be truly unique so as not to be applicable elsewhere 
(which is rare), (ii) take place within ranges and dimensions sufficiently limited so as not 
to be of significance to sub-national political leaders, or (iii) modify and improve existing 
national policies in such a way as can be generalized across the country. The last criterion 
virtually ensures that those attempting local innovation will not have the “copyright” to the 
products of their experiments, and will thus bear only the cost but not reap the competitive 
rewards of innovation.133 Meanwhile, the fact that the doctrine that tax legislative power 
must be centralized has never been given sufficient policy justification is becoming more 
and more noticeable, as China moves further and further away from the political economy 
background of the 1994 tax reform. The central government’s attempt to tout the doctrine 
as “the law” rings hollow, because the statutes and regulations that reflect such doctrine are 
themselves so ambiguous and incomplete, and have hardly been complied with by the State 
Council itself.134
Thirdly, a coherent system of allocating taxing powers in China is difficult to envision at 
this point, for a number of reasons. To start with, the allocation of spending responsibilities 
is still largely unclear, and the current extent of devolution of expenditures is in all likeli-
133. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal 
Stud. 593 (1980).
134. The indefinite prolonging of the delegation of tax legislative power to the State Council, in contradiction to 
article 11 of the Law on Legislation, is only one example.
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hood non-optimal.135 The existence of a vertical fiscal gap thus does not imply that taxing 
power should be further decentralized, it may equally mean that expenditure responsibilities 
should be more centralized. Moreover, the political system tends towards centralization, and 
presents obstacles to borrowing other countries’ arrangements. The fact, for example, that 
relatively few jurisdictions beneath the provincial level possess even delegated legislative 
power136 seem to rule out the imposition of truly local taxes, such as the property taxes 
adopted by the lowest level of governments in the US, Canada, and Australia. Furthermore, 
as other scholars have pointed out,137 if local government officials are not really account-
able to their local constituencies for spending and taxing decisions, many of the textbook 
arguments for decentralization would not apply. What assumptions one should make in the 
Chinese context about these exogenous factors determining optimal tax assignment is a very 
difficult question. 
In summary, many factual and conceptual issues remain to be clarified before one can arrive 
at the conclusion that, in its pursuit of economic development in the last three decades, 
China has developed a “model” for fiscal federalism that is demonstrably superior to certain 
other models.138 Instead, what the economic consequences of the fiscal arrangement that has 
prevailed since 1994 are, and what the directions of future reform are, will probably continue 
to be debated for a long time to come. 
135. See notes 3-5 and the commentaries cited in note 7 above.
136. See text accompanying notes 18-21 above.
137. See, e.g. Roy W. Bahl, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Local Public Finance: What Is Next on 
the Reform Agenda?” in Joyce Yanyun Man and Yu-Hung Hong (eds.), China’s Local Public Finance in 
Transition (Lincoln Institute 2010); Richard Bird , “Taxation and Decentralization,” Economic Premise, No. 
38, November 2010 (World Bank).
138. Compare the facts presented in this report to the discussion in, for example, Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian and 
Barry R. Weingast, “Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style,” Journal of 
Public Economics, September 2005, 89 (9-10), pp. 1719-1742.
